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HELENA ROSENBLATI

Two Liberals on Religion :
Tocqueville and Constant Compared1
As founding fathers of modem liberalism, Benjamin Constant and
Alexis de Tocqueville shared a common sensibility as weil as a number
of key concems. Of central importance to both men was the need to
protect individual rights and freedoms against what they saw as an
enéroaching social power. Having leamed the lessons of the French
Revolution, they knew that power, whether concentrated in the hands of
one man, or executed in the name of the «people», was a dangerous
thing. Thus they worked throughout their lives to establish and defend
a representative system with constitutional guarantees that would protect
fundamental rights such as freedom of the press, the safety of private
property, and religious toleration. Both men felt that such guarantees
were essential to shield individuals from despotic government.
But both Constant and Tocqueville also agreed that, in the end, laws
and constitutions were not enough. Indeed, this was another important
lesson they drew from the Revolution. After ail, a succession of constitu
tions had corne and gone without ever successfully bringing the
Revolution to a close. On the contrary, France had experienced successi
vely more violent upheavals and excesses. Evidently, liberal political
structures needed something more than laws and constitutions to survive.
The success of liberal regimes depended on the social, intellectual and
moral capital of the society that they govemed.
However, to many people in the nineteenth century, things seemed to
be getting worse, not better. Judging by the egoism, materialism and
social fragmentation that they observed ail around them, society was
heading in the wrong direction. Frenchmen on the left as well as the right
worried that their country was in the midst of a spiritual and moral crisis.
In intellectual elites and governing circles, the moral education of France
became a high priority. Sorne argued for a retum to the Catholic Church;

1

This paper was delivered at the Society for French Historical Studies conference in
Paris, 17-20 June, 2004.
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others placed their hopes in a « new Christianity »2 that might save
France ; still others attempted to find a secular or nondenominational
morality that would serve the stabilizing and moralizing function of
religion. But everyone agreed that successful political systems needed to
be undergirded by the appropriate moral values. On all sides there were
calls for a « unifying doctrine » that would put an end to the spiritual
and intellectual « anarchy » that was thought to be corrosive to social
order3.
That Tocqueville was deeply interested in such questions is of course
well known4• « Je suis bien convaincu », he wrote in 1853, « que les
societes politiques sont, non ce que les font leurs lois, mais ce que les
preparent d' avance a etre les sentiments, les croyances, les idees, les
habitudes de cceur et d'esprit des hommes qui les composent [...] » 5 . In
his masterpiece, De la democratie en Amerique, Tocqueville wrote at length
about the religious and moral values he thought were needed to educate,
moderate and ultimately sustain democracy.
That Benjamin Constant was also interested in such questions is less
well known. Indeed, as Biancamaria Fontana notes in her introduction to
Constant's Political Writings, Constant's thought« is currently associated
with the very opposite of the promotion of moral values » 6 • He is most
famous for his often-cited defense of modem liberty, in which he stressed
man's right to the unobstructed enjoyment of « private pleasures » and
« private independence >>7. Again and again in his writings, Constant
condemned any interference by political or ecclesiastical authorities in the
private feelings, tastes and beliefs of citizens. Indeed, his stem denuncia-

2

Edward Berenson, « A New Religion of the Left : Christianity and Social Radicalism
in France, 1815-1848 », in The French Revolution and the Transformation of Modern
Political Culture, vol m, Fran~ois and Mona Ozouf (eds), New York, Pergamon Press,
1989.
3
I explore this question further in my « Re-evaluating Benjamin Constant's
liberalism: industrialism, Saint-Simonianism and the Restoration years», History of
European Ideas, 30, l, 2004, p. 23-37.
• For Tocqueville's views on religion, see in particular Doris Goldstein, Trial of Faith.
Religion and Politics in Tocqueville's Thought, New York, Elsevier, 1975 ; Joshua Mitchell,

The Fragility of Freedom. Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy and the American Future,
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995; Agnes Antoine, L'impense de la
democratie. Tocqueville, la citoyennete et la religion, Fayard, 2003.
5
Tocqueville to Corcelle, 17 September 1853, in Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville
et de Francisque de Corcelle, auvres completes, vol. XV, Paris, Gallimard, 1983, p. 80.
6
« Introduction », ii;i Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana
(transl. and ed.), New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 26.
The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, ibid., p. 316-317.
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ti.on of the Jacobin regime focused precisely upon the violence it had
exercised on individual rights in the name of allegedly desirable moral
and social goals. Moreover, in the scholarship on Constant, we are
frequently reminded of his incurable gambling problems, his womanizing, his supposed flip-flopping on important issues ; he was not a man,
it would seem, very concerned about moral values.
Recently, however, a small but growing number of scholars have been
focusing attention on a much-neglected, but important, aspect of
Constant's liberalism : precisely the part of his thinking that concerns
morals and values. Like Tocqueville, Constant was in fact a keen social
observer, and very interested in the psychological and moral mechanisms
underpinning society. Also like Tocqueville, Constant was convinced that
a liberal polity needed moral citizens to survive. It is an aspect of
Constant's thought that comes to light very quickly if one pays attention
to his writings on religion. He wrote essays, chapters and books on
religion, most notably a five-volume scholarly treatise entitled De la

religion consideree dans sa source, ses formes et ses developpements (1824-1831),
upon which he worked his entire adult life. It is worth noting that
Constant himself regarded this book as his most important undertaking
and achievement.
This essay will briefly compare and contrast the views of Tocqueville
and Constant on the right role of religion in modern society. I have two
main reasons for doing this. One is to generate interest in this still
neglected side of Constant's thinking. The other is to contribute in a small
way to a more nuanced and historically sensitive appreciation of
Tocqueville. In America, Tocqueville is very popular. At present, he is
especially admired by those (and they are many) who see a crisis in
American democracy and attribute it to a decline in religion and moral
values. To them Tocqueville offers profound reflections on « the excesses
of the democratic soul » 8. It is my opinion that despite the valiant efforts
of a handful of scholars much of this scholarship is lacking in historical
perspective. For example, it often treats Tocqueville as if he alone among
liberals understood and appreciated the importance of 'religion, and the
significance of values. Moreover, it seems to forget that Tocqueville wrote
with a mainly French audience in mind - and this perspective necessarily
colored his observations and judgments in ways we should not ignore.
This paper is a modest attempt to help resituate Tocqueville's ideas on
religion in their proper nineteenth century French context by contrasting
them to those of Benjamin Constant. Comparing the views of Constant
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and Tocqueville allows us to see more clearly their distinctiveness. It also
enables us to appreciate the richness and complexity of early liberalism's
engagement with the question of religion. Even just a quick glance at the
ideas of these seminal thinkers reminds us that classical liberalism is a far
richer and complex body of thought than its current critics - and even
some of its admirers - will allow.
First, some important similarities. Both Constant and Tocqueville
approached religion from the social and political point of view - which
is to say that they were disciples of Montesquieu. They agreed that the
usefulness of religion had little if anything to do with its truth; their
primary concern in writing was not salvation, but life right here on earth.
Moreover, both men wrote about the importance of religion despite the
fact that their own faith was somewhat problematic and insecure.
Constant was born into a Swiss Calvinist family, but had an unconventional upbringing to say the least. He seems to have started his adult life as
a convinced atheist only gradually to become, partly through his own
research into religion, a questioning and unsettled agnostic9, who felt a
growing respect for religion and a need to believe that was, however,
never entirely satisfied. Tocqueville, on the other hand, grew up in a
pious Catholic milieu and was educated by a Jansenist-leaning abbe for
whom he expressed considerable affection and respect. At the age of 16,
he suffered a painful loss of faith through exposure to irreligious
literature at the lycee. Apparently, he never quite recovered from this
crisis, to his own great disappointment. Both Constant and Tocqueville
thus struggled with their own religiosity, at times seeming to wish that
they were more religious than they really were. To his friend, Tocqueville
confessed« Jene suis pas croyant » but he quickly added« ce que je suis
loin de dire pour me vanter »10• Constant could very well have said the
same thing.
Neither man, it should be noted, expressed adherence to any of the
specifically theological doctrines of Christianity ; they both appreciated
religion for essentially social, political and moral reasons. Constant, a
thinker of Protestant descent and culture, examined the politico-religious
conditions in Catholic France; whereas Tocqueville, a scion of the
Catholic nobility, meditated on the manners and morals of a Protestant
country. There was a similar practical edge to both men's work since both
men were politicians as well as theorists. As such they were keenly
interested in what was politically necessary to preserve liberty in post9

Henri Gouhier, Benjamin Constant devant la religion. Paris, Desclee de Brouwer, 1989,
coll. « Les ecrivains devant Dieu », p. 41.
10
Tocqueville to Gobineau, 2 octobre 1843, CEuvres Completes, Paris, Gallimard, vol.
IX, 1959, p. 57.
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Revolutionary France. Keeping liberty alive and civilization on the right
track was a shared '-concern - and for this religion was essential.
Fundamental to both men was the idea that religion was a force against
despotism. This may surprise modern readers. Constant and Tocqueville
agreed that it was a lack of religion that prepared people for servitude.
Constant expressed himself unambiguously on this question : « L' absence
du sentiment religieux favorise [... ] toutes les pretentions de la tyrannie »1\while the presence of religious sentiment favors liberty. « Des
peuples religieux ont pu @tre esclaves », he wrote, but« aucun peuple
irreligieux n'est demeure libre » 12• Only a few years later, Tocqueville
expressed himself similarly : « C'est le despotisme qui peut se passer de
la foi, mais non la liberte. [...] s'il n'a pas de foi, il faut qu'il serve, et, s'il
est libre, qu'il croie. » 13
Religion was needed in liberal and democratic polities because it
combated egoism and destructive individualism. The two men agreed on
this as well. Regretfully, Constant noted that modern men tended to be
« dominated by egoism and softened by luxury >>1''. Religion countered
this egoism ; it pulled self-interested and often apathetic men out of
themselves, teaching them« la puissance du sacrifice »15 • Religion, along
with all the other noble passions « font sortir l'homme du cercle etroit de
ses interets » 16• « Laliberte », Constant insisted,« se nourrit de sacrifices
[... ] [elle] ne peut s'etablir, ne peut se conserver, que par le desinteressement. » 17
Likewise, Tocqueville wrote that, through the injunction of brotherly
love, Christianity drew men out of themselves, thus counteracting the
isolating effects of individualism. But he believed that this was in fact an
effect of all religions :
11 n'y a point de religion qui ne place I'objet des desirs de l'homme au-dela
et au-dessus des biens de la terre, et qui n'eleve naturellement son fune vers
des regions fort superieurs a celles des sens18•

11

Benjamin Constant, De la religion consideree dans sa source, ses ftmnes et ses developpements, Etienne Hofmann and Tzvetan Todorov (eds.), Aries, Actes Sud, 1999, p. 62.

l2
13

Ibid.
A. de Tocqueville, De la democratie en Amerique, Eduardo Nolla (ed.}, Paris, Vrin,
1990, vol. I, p. 229 ; vol. II, p. 34.
14
De la religion, op. cit., p. 245.
15
Principes de politique, in B. Constant Ecrits politiques, Marcel Gauchet (ed.), Paris,
Gallimard, 1997, p. 466.
16
Ibid., p. 465.
17
B. Constant, De la religion, qp. cit., p. 34, 62.
ls De la democratie en Amerique, qp. cit., vol. II, p. 34.
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Very much like Constant, Tocqueville worried that without religion,
people would succumb to « le gout du bien--etre » 19, an exaggerated
« amour des jouissances materielles »20 and an « indifference complete
et brutale de l'avenir »21 • To Tocqueville, religion encouraged the
longterm thinking essential to making moral decisions. All this is why
Tocqueville believed religion to be« beaucoup plus necessaire clans [...]
les republiques democratiques que dans toutes les autres » 22 •
Both men also shared the belief that religion was « natural » to man. To
Constant, religion was an indestructible «emotion», « un sentiment
inherent a l'homme »23• Similarly, Tocqueville called religion a natural
human « instinct. » To him it was the lack of religion that was unnatural :
« L'incredulite », he wrote, « est un accident; la foi seule est l'etat
permanent de l'hwnanite. »24
Why, then, had religious belief visibly declined over the course of the
eighteenth century ? Both men responded similarly. According to
Constant, it had to do with the illiberal and intolerant policies of both
·
ecclesiastical and political authorities :
{O]n a denature la religion. L'on a poursuivil'homme dans ce dernier asyle,
dans ce sanctuaire intime de son existence. La persecution provoque la
revolte25•

According to Tocqueville as well, church and state attempts to enforce
religious compliance were counterproductive. Such policies drove people
away from religion. But religion would naturally reassert itself once such
ill-conceived policies were rescinded.
This brings us to another important point on which Constant and
Tocqueville agreed. Both men were strong advocates of church/state
separation - and this in the interest of both religion and the state. In their
minds, a fruitful collaboration between politics and religion was only
possible under the conditions of legal disestablishment and religious
toleration such as was found in America. Indeed, both referred to
America as a place where the separation of church and state was having
favorable effects.

19

20
21

22

Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., p. 34.
Ibid., p. 134.

De la dbnocratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. I, p. 229.
Du developpement progressif des idees religieuses, in Ecrits politiques, op. cit., p. 639.
24
De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. I, p. 231.
25
Principes de politique, in B. Constant, op. cit., p. 468.
23
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Having considered some of their main areas of agreement, we can now
turn to their differences. Let us begin by considering the definition of
religion. To Constant, the essence of religion is religious sentiment, which,
as we have seen, he describes as an intuitive and indestructible «emo
tion » inherent in all human beings. In the course of history, this inner
sentiment has taken on outward «forms», that is, the dogmas and
ceremonies of established religions. These forms are necessarily tran
sient - good for only a time. In his scholarly treatise De la religion,
Constant describes the dynamic between form and sentiment in some
detail, arguing that it causes the gradual improvement of religion by a
natural process motored by the liberating force of sentiment. The point
is that for Constant, it is religious sentiment - something that inheres in
all varieties of religion - that does the good work of moralizing indivi
duals. It is religious sentiment that pulls individuals out of themselves,
causing them to give of themselves and improve themselves26•
Tocqueville, on the other hand, occasionally speaks of religious
« sentiments » or «instincts » - normally using the plural - but he differs
dramatically from Constant when he asserts that it is dogma that is « la
substance des religions »27• Indeed, for Tocqueville, not only is it dogma
that does the beneficial work of religion for society, but it is the fact that
dogma is fixed that appeals to him. He believes that« [d]es idees arretees
sur Dieu et la nature humaine sont indispensables a la pratique journa
liere de [la] vie »28• This is true for individuals as well as societies.
Unsettled ideas prepare men for servitude and lead only to « [le]
desordre et l'impuissance»29•
For Tocqueville, doubts and questions about religion are profoundly
disturbing to people : « Cette perpetuelle agitation de toutes choses les
inquiete et les fatigue. »30 Such intellectual restlessness is dangerous
because it leads to a type of despair that is conducive to political apathy
and thus to despotism. Men are simply not strong enough to cope with
religious and political freedom simultaneously. « Pour moi », Tocqueville
wrote, « je doute que l'homme puisse jamais supporter a la fois une
complete independance religieuse et une entiere liberte politique.»31 In
order for citizens to remain politically alert and engaged, their imagina26

I explain this further in my « Commerce et religion dans le liberalisme de Benjamin
Constant», Commentaire, vol. 102 (ete 2003), p. 415-426.
v De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. II, p. 36.
28 Ibid., p. 33.
29 Ibid., p. 33.
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31
Ibid., p. 34.
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tions in matters of religion must be quelled. They need settled answers
to unsettling questions. What is good in America is that you have a
religion« qu'on croit sans la discuter[...], les Americains, ayant admis sans
examen les principaux dogmes de la religion chretienne [ ... J »32• Joshua
Mitchell has recently called this « the cornerstone » of Tocqueville's
liberalism. The« paradox of freedom[... ] is that it requires an obedience,
a passivity before God »33• Indeed, it is with considerable admiration
that Tocqueville describes the subduing action of religion on the human
mind:
L'esprit humain [...] s'arrete de lui-meme; il depose en tremblant l'usage
de ses plus redoutables facultes [...]; il s'abstient meme de soulever le voile
du sanctuaire ; il s'incline avec respect devant des verites qu'il admet sans les
discutei34.

Elsewhere, Tocqueville refers to this voluntary submission to religious
dogma as« un joug salutaire » 35•
This is about as far from Constant's point of view as you can get.
According to Constant, no social good can come from inflicting an
intellectual or spiritual straight-jacket on human beings. Taking what
seems to be the opposite stance to Tocqueville' s, Constant argued not
only that spiritual submission would be counter-productive, leading to
« apathy » and « numbness »36 in the citizenry, but that it would be
profoundly immoral as well. Religious questioning and striving is always
a good thing for Constant, who speaks with evident pride and awe of
« cette noble inquietude qui nous poursuit et qui nous tourmente,
cette ardeur d'etendre nos lumieres et de developper nos facultes »37•
« L'homme a ete cree pour s'instruire, pour s'eclairer, et par la m�me,
pour s'adoucir et s'ameliorer. »38 It is for this reason that God endowed
man with« un penchant invincible a !'investigation et a l'examen »39.To
obstruct this penchant would be to go against God ; it would be to favor
both superstition in religion and despotism in politics. In fact, an
32

Ibid., p. 17, emphasis added.
J. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 206.
34
De la democratie en Amerique, up. cit., vol. I, p. 35. A. Antoine (up. cit., p. 148-154) is
insightful on this.
35
De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. II, p. 33.
36
De M. Dunoyer et de quelques-uns de ses ouvrages, in B. Constant, Ecrits politiques,
op. cit., p. 676.
37
De la liberte des anciens comparee a celle des modernes, in Ecrits politiques, up. cit., p. 617.
38
De M. Dunoyer [... ], up. cit., p. 662.
39
Du developpement progressif des idees religieuses, ibid., p. 635.

33

Two Liberals on Religion : Tocqueville and Constant

I

l

167

..I;11
I
..
'I .

individual's use of private judgment is not just recommended; it is
required - and it is this which will save civilization from its own
materialistic, depoliticizing and de-spiritualizing tendencies.
To try to foster and/ or defend a unity of doctrine is equally unnatural
and harmful. To Constant, the proliferation of sects is a good thing.
Repeatedly, Constant insists that societies have nothing to fear from
intellectual and spiritual pluralism. « Cette multitude des sectes dont on
s'epouvante », he wrote, « est ce qu'il y a pour la religion de plus
salutaire »40• If authorities would just let religion be, « les sectes se
multiplieraient a l'infini », causing a healthy competition between them
which would have both favorable intellectual and moral repercussions41.
Freedom of conscience is the motor of human progress ; it is what allows
Christianity to be « perfectible » and to stay forever relevant in other
words to improve over time. Constant added that this was a process that
one could see at work in the United States. George Armstrong Kelly was
right, I think, when he several years ago called Constant's point of view
broadly« Protestant» - for such was its tendencies and sources42•
Tocqueville, on the other hand, adopts a point of view that is quite
critical of Protestantism. Indeed, in the second volume of Democracy in
America, he suggests that it is Catholicism and not Protestantism that
would be most effective in democratic regimes. Modern men have a
profound need for the certainty that only Catholicism provides. When it
comes to religion, Tocqueville insists that « l' esprit d'independance
individuelle [... ] est le plus dangereux de tous »43• Not surprisingly, then,
he shows considerable contempt for the revival movement that he had
the opportunity to observe in America. He refers to the new sects as
« fanatical spiritualism » and « religious insanity» - « folies religieuses »44 - and laments « !'horrible portrait » of men « se livrant a des
transports qui les font descendre au-dessous des brutes » 45 • Luckily,
Tocqueville adds, this bizarre phenomenon is just a momentary aberra-
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Principes de politique, ibid., p. 476.
Ibid., p. 477.
42
George Armstrong Kelly, The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tocqueville and French
Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 76. Kurt Kloocke is the
expert on Constant's connections with German Protestant thought. Start with
« Benjamin Constant et I' Allemagne : Individualite - Religion - Politique », Anna/es
Benjamin Constant, vol. 27, 2003 ; on this, see also James Lee, « Benjamin Constant :
The Moralization of Modem Liberty», Ph.D. dissertation, University of WisconsinMadison, 2003
43
De la democratie en Amerique, op. cit., vol. II, p. 38.
44
Ibid., p. 122.
45
Ibid., appendix, p. 320.
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tion, which assuredly will not last. As the American example proves,
modern men are endowed with « un instinct cache qui les pousse a leur
insu vers le catholicisme »46• It is this that accounts for the fact that
« [l]'Amerique est[ ... ] le pays ou [... Jla religion catholique fait le plus de
progres »47•
Agnes Antoine has recently argued that, in its main lines, Tocqueville's
point of view echoed that of the French Catholic Church, while Joshua
Mitchell has made a strong case for its Augustinian and Pascalian
sources. It is quite surprising to observe this seminal liberal thinker
consistently associating religion with the salutary submission to authority.
Manifestly, religion serves for Tocqueville as a kind of mind-police48•
While Constant believed that religion supported free govermnents
because the Protestant spirit of examination contributed directly to
democratic culture, for Tocqueville, religion played the role of a
«palliative», a «remedy» and an «antidote» to what he held to be
democracy's harmful tendencies49 • One could say that both men in fact
adopted older arguments already current during the Enlightemnent ;
however, Tocqueville viewed religion mainly as a bridle, while Constant
saw it more as a spur'm.
I could end the story here, but I think it would be misleading, with
regard to Tocqueville. It would be to neglect what appears to have been
a significant shift in his thinking several years after he wrote De la
democratie en Amerique. There is indeed evidence that Tocqueville
underwent a change in outlook about religion. It is something briefly
noted by Doris Goldstein some years ago, but curiously neglected by
scholarship since51 •
Tocqueville's deep frustration with, and contempt for, the oppressive
imperial regime installed by Louis Napoleon after his coup d'Etat in 1851
is well known. Others before me have argued that witnessing the political
46
47

48

Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid.

A. Antoine, op. cit., p. 152. Stephen Holmes has gone further, claiming that
Tocqueville in fact viewed religion « more or less in the counter-Enlightenment
tradition, as a salutary opium of the people. » S. Holmes, « Constant and Tocqueville :
An Unexplored Relationship», Annales Benjamin Constant, vol. 12, 1991, p. 40.
49
Words repeatedly used (rightly, I think) by Joshua Mitchell to describe Tocqueville's
view of religion.
50
On religion as a« bridle» and/or« spur», see Helena Rosenblatt,« The Christian
Enlightenment », The Cambridge History of Christianity, vol VIl : Enlightenment,
Revolution and Reawakening (1660-1815), Timothy Tackett and Stewart Brown (eds),
forthcoming 2005.
51
D. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 90-97.
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deterioration of France led Tocqueville to emphasize more than ever the
importance of political participation in sustaining liberal and democratic
regimes52• But what is generally overlooked is that he seems not only to
have begun to reconceptualize his notion of democracy, but that he also
seems to have reconsidered the relationship between Christianity and
citizenship.
By the 1850s, and along with other liberal Catholics, Tocqueville became
increasingly frustrated by the transformation of Catholicism into what
Montalembert referred to as a « school of servitude». The ease with
which French Catholics accepted Napoleon's imperial rule was distressing
proof of Christianity's basic failure to encourage citizenship. According
to Tocqueville, this had to change. Evidence of his new perspective
appears in the Ancien Regime et Ia Revolution. Moreover, in a series of
letters to his friend, Sophie Swetchine, Tocqueville clarified his altered
view of the role of the Church. He now argued that the Catholic clergy
should assume responsibility for reanimating public spirit in France. Since
1789, he explained, French priests had been shirking their duty. Their
role, Tocqueville argued, was not just to teach<< private » virtues, but also
« public » ones ; thus would they help restore a desperately needed sense
of citizenship in an apathetic population. Priests should teach their
parishioners that they belong not only to a heavenly community, but to
a « patrie » as well :
Je desirerais qu'ils fissent penetrer plus avant clans les fun.es que chacun se
doit a cet etre collectif [la patrie] avant de s'appartenir a soi-meme; qu'a
l'egard de cet etre-la, il n'est pas permis de tomber dans !'indifference, bien
moins encore de faire de cette indifference une sorte de molle vertu [...] tous
sont responsables [... ] de veiller ace qu'il ne soit soumis qu'a des autorites
bienfaisantes, respectables et legitime [... ] Voila ce que je voudrais qu'on
inculqutl.t aux homrnes [...}53

In conclusion I would say that Constant's and Tocqueville's perspec-

tives - though both liberal - were, quite different1 reflecting their different
temperaments, backgrounds and immediate historical contexts. According
52

Fran<;0is Furet and Fran~oise Melonio were the first to argue for a late change in
Tocqueville's thought by which he reversed his concept of democracy. I have learned
much about this from the work of Mel Richter. See in particular his « Tocqueville and
Guizot on democracy: from a type of society to a political regime», in History of
European Ideas, 30, 1, 2004, p. 61-82. But see also Cheryl Welch's piece in the same
journal.
53
Tocqueville to M""' Swetchine, 20 October 1856, in Lettres inedites de Madame
Swetchine publiees par le comte de Falloux, Paris, Didier & Cie, 1866, p. 467.
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to Tocqueville - and although his position evolved over time - religion's
express role was to enable political liberty, and hence to prevent the
degeneration of democracy into despotism. In Democracy in America,
where he viewed democracy mainly as a « social condition » and not as
a political form, he saw religion as an antidote to democracy's dangerous
social side-effects. Later in life, when he viewed democracy more
politically, he hoped that religion would directly encourage political life.
In contrast, I think that Constant focused more on the individual and
his intellectual and moral progress. He saw religious and political liberty
as together contributing to the improvement of man - « le triomphe de
l'individualite », as he called it:54. Indeed, there is a sense that for
Constant this is what both liberal political regimes and religion are for
they are there to enable human beings to develop their moral and
intellectual faculties. I believe it is this that Constant was referring to
when he wrote that « ce n'est pas au bonheur seul, c'est au perfectionne
ment que notre destin nous appelle » ;
ce n'est point I'absence de la religion, mais sa presence avec la liberte
politique et religieuse qu'il faut invoquer comme la source unique de tous Jes
progres intellectuels, aussi bien que de toutes les vertus55•
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